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stitutionality issue again, now that the
proper route has been clearly delineated
as one of writ of certiorari. Likewise, this
5-4 decision regarding the "status" of
D.C. statutes will have to be addressed by
Congress in future legislative provisions





by Bert Riddell Cramer
An unindicted co-conspirator is denied
due process when a Federal grand jury ac-
cuses him, by name, of criminal miscon-
duct in an indictment, and then fails to
return an indictment against him. This
was the holding by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia in Application of Jordan,
439 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.W.Va. 1977).
In his Memorandum and Order, Judge
J. H. Young found that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects not only those who are to
be prosecuted, but those not to be as'wll,
and ordered that all references to George
B. Jordan, Jr. in the grand jury's indict-
ment and other official documents be ex-
punged.
In December of 1975, petitioner Jor-
dan, then Commissioner of Banking from
the State of West Virginia, and another
person were named as "co- conspirators
but not as defendants" in a Federal grand
jury indictment. Jordan was not indicted,
and those named as defendants were ac-
quitted. Jordan subsequently petitioned
the District Court, arguing, inter alia, that
he was (1) deprived of his due process
right to be either formally charged and
permitted to defend himself at trial, or
charged and permitted to defend himself
at trial, or else remain uncharged and
unstigmatized; and that (2) the grand
jury's naming him as an unindicted co-
conspirator was ultra vires.
Judge Young began consideration of
these arguments by tracing the history of
the grand jury, noting that it historically
had two functions: 1) to protect in-
dividuals from arbitrary or malicious
governmental prosecution; and 2) to fer-
ret-out and present for trial persons
suspected of criminal wrongdoing. The
shielding function of the grand jury found
Constitutional expression in the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of a presenta-
tion or indictment by a grand jury as a
sine qua non for federal prosecution for
serious crimes. 439 F.Supp at 202.
Acknowledging the lack of case law on
this particular issue, the court relied pri
marily on a Fifth Circuit case, United
States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (1975),
which held that the federal courts can ex-
punge the names of unindicted co-con-
spirators from indictments and related
official material when the stigma which
inevitably attaches is part of an overall
governmental tactic directed against dis-
favored persons or groups, or when, as in
Jordan's circumstances, all avenues of
redress have been effectively eliminated.
Briggs, supra, at 806.
Judge Young stated that none of the
historical or modern-day functions of the
grand jury encompasses public accusa-
tions directed at persons not named as de-
fendants, and he noted that the grand
jury's function ceases when probable
cause is not found to return an indict-
ment. "There is no place in a criminal in-
dictment," he wrote, "for mention of a
person accused of a crime who is not for-
mally accused of that crime by being in-
dicted." 439 F.Supp. at 204.
Thus, whether the grand jury failed to
indict Jordan because 1) there was no
probable cause; 2) the prosecutor did not
ask for an indictment; or 3) the grand jury
simply chose not to indict Jordan for
whatever reasons, "its only course of ac
tion was to remain silent (his emphasis) as
to Jordan." Id. at 204.
In determining the nature and extent of
the grand jury's power, practical con-
siderations were of some weight. The
Court noted the decline of the indepen-
dence of the grand jury in the wake of the
increasing complexity of criminal matters,
and the concomitant expansion of the
prosecutor's role in examining witnesses,
presenting documents and requesting in-
dictments. While recognizing that federal
prosecutors had, in the past, obtained
grand jury indictments naming unindicted
co-conspirators, Judge Young reasoned
that this alone should not "dull judicial
sensibilities to the impropriety of the ac-
tion." 493 F.Supp. at 203.
Distinguishing earlier cases dealing
with named co-conspirators not indicted,
including the Nixon Grand Jury case (see
APRIL, 1978 35
In Re Report and Recommendation of
June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F.Supp.
1219 (D.D.C. 1974)), the court stressed
that here, unlike other reported cases
upholding the naming of unindicted co-
conspirators, all legal remedies were in-
adequate, and all forums of redress were
closed. 439 F.Supp. at 205, 209.
Clearly then, Judge Young wrote, the
indictment and related material naming
Jordan as a co-conspirator involved in
criminal activity was an improper exercise
of the grand jury function. 439 F.Supp at
205.
Jordan's Fifth Amendment argument
turned on his alleged deprivation of his
due process rights to be permitted the
protection of the federal indictment pro-
cess secured under the Fifth Amendment
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. The Court agreed, noting that
whether or not the Supreme Court has
effectively eliminated due process protec-
tion of reputation claims arising out of
state action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, see
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),
where, as here, a federal grand jury fails to
establish a finding of probable cause by
naming, but not indicting the named co-
conspirators, there is an injury transgress-
ing the "guarantee of a right to be free of
injury secured by the federal Constitution
in the indictment clause of the Fifth
Amendment and by other federal laws."
439 F.Supp. at 208.
Since the "only legitimate means by
which the federal grand jury could
publicly indicate such a finding of proba
ble cause was by the action of indicting
Jordan," and since Jordan lacked totally
any form or forum in which to challenge
the grand jury's action, the Fifth Amend-
ment's protection was properly invokable.





The unique facts of Tri-County Federal
Savings and Loan Association u. Lyle,
280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977), make
it one of first impression in Maryland. Ac-
cording to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, 33 Md.App. 46, 363 A.2d 642,
645, the peculiarities of Maryland law in
this case render the holdings of other ju-
risdictions of little assistance in its in-
terpretation.
In April, 1974, Lyle and his wife ex
ecuted a note to Tri-County for $60,000
at an interest of 8%,i in return for a loan
commitment from that financial institu
tion to enable the Lyles to build a home.
The note was secured by a deed of trust,
with the Savings & Loan as a beneficiary.
Tri-County's check for $60,000 was en-
dorsed by the Lyles at settlement, and
$15,000 was immediately disbursed to
the seller of the lot, upon which the Lyles
were to construct their house. The re-
mainder, $45,000, was paid over to the
defendant, Tri-County, where it was
placed into a non-escrow account. The
$45,000, according to the loan agree-
ment, was to be paid in nine installments
MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49, §3 (1972) permits simple
interest not in excess of 6% annually to be charged,
except where there is a written agreement between
lender and borrower, in which case 8% simple in-
terest annually may be charged on the unpaid bal-
ance.
as work on the house progressed. Tri-
County also collected a $60 appraisal fee,
$10 for a credit report, and $90 for in-
spection fees, the first two fees being paid
to third parties. See generally, B.F. Saul
Co. v. West End Park, 250 Md. 707, 246
A.2d 591 (1968). Subsequently, the
Lyles abandoned the project, and in Sep-
tember, 1974, repaid the $15,000 plus
$573.29 interest which had accrued on
the full $60,000.2 Credit was given for
the $45,000 retained by the defendant,
and the $90 in inspection fees was
returned to the plaintiffs. Because it was
paid in accordance with the agreed upon
schedule, interest was computed on the
full $60,000.
The Lyles sued, contending that the
$60 appraisal fee, the $10 credit report
fee, and the 8% interest charged on the
$45,000 were usurious. Their claim of
$4,911.75 was based on the remedy
enunciated by the Maryland statute.3 The
trial court found that the fees were not in
excess of that allowed by the law and dis-
missed the suit.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed
the trial judge's disposition of the claim
regarding the interest on the $45,000 and
remanded the case. 33 Md.App. 46, 363
A.2d 642.
The Court of Appeals, after granting
certiorari, affirmed the lower appellate
court's holding that the credit appraisal
and inspection fees played no role in the
alleged usury. Secondly, the court held
that the Lyles were required to pay in
terest only on the unpaid balance of the
loan, $15,000, because they did not have
control of the remaining $45,000. Re
quiring the plaintiffs to pay interest on the
full $60,000 rendered the agreement
usurious. Id. at 76, 371 A.2d at 427.
2 In order to obtain relief in equity against a usurious
contract, ancient doctrine holds that the plaintiff
must tender moth the principal and the legal interest
which has accrued. Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md.Ch. 44
(1847).
1 MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 49, §8 (1972) articulates the
current usury law which might have allowed Tri
county to charge an interest rate of 10% because the
loan here was secured by residential real property. In
this case, however, this section was inapplicable
because the loan was executed before May 31, 1974,
the statute's effective date.
This section also allows a forfeiture of three times
the amount of interest and charges collected on any
loan in excess of the authorized interest and charges,
or the sum of $500.00, whichever is greater.
See MD. COMM. LAW CODE ANN §§12 114 (a),
12 103(b) (1975).
I- ________________________________________________________________________________________
THE FORUM
